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This paper studies a series of capital market promotion policies Korea 
pursued over a 30-year period during its development era (1960s – 
1980s). The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first purpose is to 
understand the policy approaches Korea took, and the second is to 
extract lessons that can benefit policymakers in the developing world, 
where capital market promotion is an important policy goal. There are 
two key features of Korea’s capital market promotion policies. First, 
the government was actively involved, sometimes indirectly by giving 
tax incentives to encourage IPOs. However, in other times, it was 
directly involved by giving IPO orders and threatening those that did 
not comply. No stock exchange in a developed country has ever 
experienced such government involvement. Combined with rapid 
economic growth, this interventionist approached allowed the Korean 
stock market to experience phenomenal growth over a short period of 
time. Second, the capital market promotion policies had multiple 
objectives. One was to mobilize domestic capital for economic 
development. Another was to lower firms’ debt-to-equity ratios. Most 
interestingly, however, the Korean government wanted to popularize 
stock ownership, thereby allowing ordinary Koreans to share in the 
fruits of economic growth.  
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I. Introduction 
 
t is a great challenge for less developed countries to create a strong securities 
market. They lack many of the institutions that control information asymmetry and 
self-dealing. That is, legal and market institutions that ensure that minority 
shareholders (i) receive good information about the value of a company’s business 
and (ii) allow them to have trust and confidence in a company’s management and 
controlling shareholders. Regulators, prosecutors, and courts may not be honest or 
sophisticated enough to carry out this task. Accounting and financial disclosure rules 
may not be comprehensive or independently audited. Reputational intermediaries, 
such as investment bankers, accountants, and securities lawyers, may not be 
sophisticated enough nor subject to liability risk (Black 2001).  
When the Daehan Stock Exchange was established in February 1956, none of the 
necessary legal and market institutions were present. At the time, the market was 
akin to a legalized gambling casino, often plagued with speculative bubbles and 
bursts. With a limited score of listed firms, the size of the primary market was very 
small. It hardly served as a channel through which firms raised external equity capital. 
In contrast, there was an enormous secondary market. The percentage of stock 
trading, which was marginal in the 1950s, had suddenly surpassed that of 
government bonds by 1961. This was, however, attributable to a high volume of 
speculative transactions. Because speculators made use of clearing transactions, 
which is similar to today’s futures transactions, the trading volume often soared to 
unsustainable levels. On a number of occasions, this caused the Korean government 
to step in and rescue a stock exchange at the brink of a massive default.  
By 2010, however, the market capitalization of the Korea Exchange (KRX) was 
1.1 trillion USD. This ranks the KRX as the 17th largest stock exchange in the world, 
in terms of equity market capitalization (World Federation of Exchanges). What 
explains this astonishing achievement over a 50-year period? This paper is seeks to 
answer this question in part. 
This paper investigates series of capital market promotion policies Korea pursued 
over a 30-year period during its development era (1960s – 1980s). The purpose is to 
extract lessons that can benefit policymakers in the developing world, where capital 
market promotion is an important policy goal. Given that the Korean government’s 
main interest was to mobilize domestic capital for economic development and to 
lower the debt-to-equity ratio of firms, I have left out the bond market from my 
analyses, and when discussing the stock market, I have put greater emphasis on its 
primary market policies than on its secondary market policies 
The paper is composed of two parts: primary market policies (Chapter 2) and other 
supplementary policies (Chapter 3). The latter includes secondary market policies 
(Sections 1 and 2) and policy measures taken to expand the stock market’s investor 
base (Sections 3). They are both supplementary to the primary market policies for 
obvious reasons. First, no country can have a vibrant primary market without a well-
functioning secondary market, where share prices are set efficiently and shares are 
traded with reasonably low transaction costs. It is also obvious that the primary 
market cannot be enlarged by simply increasing the supply of shares. Instead, there 
should be a commensurate increase in the investor base of the stock market.  
I 
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During its development era, the mobilization of domestic capital was not the sole 
objective of the Korean government’s capital market promotion policies. Throughout 
this period, policymakers emphasized that IPOs can be used as a means by which the 
country could share in the fruits of its economic growth. This policy stance emerged 
repeatedly under many different names, such as the popularization of stock ownership, 
the democratization of stock ownership, and the socialization of corporate ownership.  
With regard to primary market policies, I cover the initial public offering (IPO) 
inducement measures taken during 1968-71 (Chapter 2, Section 1), the coercive IPO 
orders implemented during 1972-78 (Chapter 2, Section 2), and the promotion of 
IPOs and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) in the late 1980s (Chapter 2, Section 3).  
On secondary market policies, I cover the adoption of a regular transaction system 
in 1969 and the subsequent measure taken on June 3, 1971 (the 6.3 Measure) 
(Chapter 3, Section 1). I also cover a number of securities deposit and settlement 
systems that have been introduced since 1973. 
Last but not least, I cover policy measures taken to expand the stock market’s 
investor base. Specifically, I analyze the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), 
introduced in 1968 and reinforced in 1974 (Chapter 3, Section 3). For each policy 
measure, I discuss its background and detailed contents, and I present its outcome 
and evaluation.   
 
II. The Primary Market Policies 
 
A. The Initial Public Offering Inducement Measures (1968-1971) 
 
1. Background 
 
Three points are important to note as the background surrounding the IPO 
inducement measures that were taken in 1968. First, firms grew rapidly during the 
period of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966), but they also 
experienced a significant deterioration of their debt-to-equity ratios. Second, in order 
to finance the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-1971) 
successfully, there was a compelling need to mobilize domestic capital from the 
stock market (Shin 1987). However, the stock market had been in a dismal state since 
a bubble burst in 1962, and it did not function well as a source for equity capital. 
Third, as a means of raising domestic capital, the government was planning to sell its 
shares in state-owned enterprises. By doing so, the government hoped to sell its 
shares to the general public, thereby popularizing stock ownership throughout the 
country.  
Table 1 shows the external financing structure of Korean firms from 1963 to 1968. 
One notable observation is that the total amount of externally raised capital increased 
nearly tenfold during this five-year period, from 36.2 to 321.8 billion won. Another 
observation is that they were mostly raised either from foreign debt sources or from 
bank lending sources. Note that the figures under Others are mostly private loans. 
Also note that the proportion of equity financing drops from 25 percent in 1963 to 12 
percent in 1966. In the following year, it would drop further to 8 percent.  
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TABLE 1—THE EXTERNAL FINANCING STRUCTURE OF KOREAN FIRMS, 1963-1968 
(UNIT: billions of won, %) 
Year External Financing 
Debt Capital  Equity Capital 
Total Foreign Debt Bank Loans Others 
 Amount Percentage 
1963  36.2  27.1   8.3   6.4 12.4   9.0 25 
1964  26.9  19.8   2.7   6.4 10.7   7.2 27 
1965  48.4  39.0   4.7  11.5 22.8   9.4 19 
1966 107.9  95.0  48.8  10.4 35.8  12.9 12 
1967 198.7 182.7  64.6  62.0 56.1  16.0  8 
1968 321.8 296.7 108.7 107.8 80.2  25.1  8 
Source: ECOS, Bank of Korea. 
 
TABLE 2—CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS, 1963-1968 
(UNIT: %) 
Year Debt-to-Equity Equity-to-Asset Interest Coverage Interest-to-Sales 
1963 92.20 52.03 405.56 3.02 
1964 84.98 54.06 273.66 4.89 
1965 82.51 54.79 320.86 3.91 
1966 106.15 48.51 236.87 5.65 
1967 127.75 43.91 227.21 5.19 
1968 167.37 37.40 212.65 5.90 
Notes: Interest coverage ratio refers to EBIT/(interest payments). 
Source: ECOS, Bank of Korea. 
 
TABLE 3—STOCK MARKET STATISTICS, 1963-1966 
(UNIT: millions of won, %) 
 1963 1964 1965 1966 
No. of Listed Firms 15 17 17 24 
Paid-in Capital Increase 608 369 100 369 
Trading Volume 26,000 27,039 9,271 11,160 
Modified Average Stock Price Index 57.27 62.47 60.94 62.87 
Producers’ Price Index (PPI) 46.30 62.30 68.50 74.40 
Notes: Modified Average Stock Price Index (1972 = 100), PPI (1970 = 100). 
Source: Rhee et al. (2005) and Hong (2005). 
Original Source: Securities Market Yearly Statistics. 
 
 
With a greater reliance on debt financing, the debt-to-equity ratio deteriorated 
rapidly for many of these companies. Table 2 illustrates the capital structure of 
manufacturing firms during the same time period. One can easily see that the debt-to-
equity and interest-to-sales ratios increased, while the equity-to-asset and interest 
coverage ratios dropped.  
Table 3 shows stock market statistics from 1963 to 1966. Although the number of 
listed firms increased slightly during this period, the number of new equity offerings 
and the trading volume both dropped. The stock market index increased as well, but 
its growth rate was well below that of the producer’s price index (PPI).1 Moreover, a 
high bank deposit rate of around 30 percent discouraged people from investing in the 
 
1Stock market index refers to the Combined (12 issues) Index (1972=100). 
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stock market (Hong 1973). Also, as of 1966, most listed firms were state-owned 
enterprises. There were only six firms which were not.  
In the second half of 1962, making stock ownership more popular emerged as a 
major policy objective. It served as a way to normalize the stock market, the 
reputation of which was significantly tarnished after the bubble burst in 1962. It was 
also influenced by the Japanese experience after World War II (Kyunghyang 
Shinmun 1962. 9. 5). When the Zaibatsu – Japanese family-controlled business 
groups – were dissolved during America’s occupation of Japan, a significant number 
of shares, originally held by the family members, were sold to company employees. 
This greatly helped to popularize stock ownership in Japan. It also changed the 
perception the Japanese had towards the stock market. No longer was the stock 
market perceived to be a place for gambling. It was instead seen as a market where 
firms could raise long-term capital, as well as a place where people could invest their 
savings.  
 
2. The Legislative Process 
 
The effort to enact laws to encourage the development of the capital market started 
with the National Assembly. Mr. Nam-June Lee and 52 other National Assemblymen 
submitted a bill entitled the Stock Investment Security Act in January of 1965. 
Although the bill did not pass the National Assembly, it triggered other similar bills 
(Rhee et al. 2005). Eventually, on September 9, 1968, the Finance and Economy 
Committee – a standing committee of the National Assembly – proposed the Capital 
Market Development Act.  
The Capital Market Development Act passed the National Assembly on November 
8, 1968 and was enacted, promulgated, and took effect on November 22, 1968. This 
Act, together with the Securities Exchange Act, constituted the two pillars of Korea’s 
securities market regulation: one for the primary market, and the other for the 
secondary market. In order to lower corporate income tax rates for those public firms 
subjected to these laws, Mr. Lee also submitted a bill to revise the Regulation Law on 
Tax Reduction and Exemption in July of 1968. This law also passed the National 
Assembly on November 8, 1968.  
The Ministry of Finance (Minister Bong-Kyun Seo) also echoed Mr. Lee’s 
arguments in July of 1967, by announcing the Capital Market Development Plan, 
which promised the sale of state-owned enterprises to the general public, as a way to 
raise government revenue and popularize stock ownership (DongA Daily Newspaper 
1967. 7. 15). However, contrary to its original plan, the state-owned enterprises were 
sold to Chaebols – family-controlled Korean business groups – at bargain prices.  
Although it was claimed that privatization was enacted for the general public, its 
laws failed to spark public interest in a meaningful way. Article 4 in the original bill 
provided that, for employees of central/local governments and state-owned 
enterprises, bonuses, pensions, severance pays, and compensations would be paid in 
securities owned by the government. This triggered strong resistance from labor 
unions. The Federation of Korean Trade Union saw the provision as an infringement 
of property rights and resolved to strike as a means of protesting the new bill (DongA 
Newspaper 1968. 7. 1). Such movements led the National Assembly to revise the bill 
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such that government-owned securities would be used as a means of payment only 
when specifically requested by the employee (DongA Newspaper 1968. 7. 4). 
Nonetheless, even this revision proved unsatisfactory to labor unions. As a result, 
Article 4 was removed in its entirety from the bill. 
 
3. The Details and Implementations of the Act 
 
Article 1 listed the Act’s objectives, which included the promotion of IPOs, the 
greater dispersion of share ownership, people’s ownership of firm shares, greater 
reliance on equity financing, and ultimately the development of a sound capital 
market. Chapter 2 of the Act covered measures to encourage dispersed share 
ownership and stock investment. Chapter 3 covered provisions on IPOs and Chapter 
4 included provisions on the establishment of the Korea Investment Development 
Corporation.  
 
3.1 Dispersed Share Ownership and Stock Investment 
 
First, to encourage people to participate in stock ownerships, the Act guaranteed 
minimum dividend yields. If dividends fell short of the level established in the 
Enforcement Decree (i.e., 10 percent), nongovernment shareholders would have 
priority in receiving dividends, until their yields reached the guaranteed level. To 
enable this, the Act allowed firms to adjust the dividends distributed to government 
shareholders. Second, the Act allowed shares to be used for paying security deposits. 
Government and state-owned enterprises were not allowed to refuse such deposit 
payments. 
Third, for shares held either by the government or by the Korea Development 
Bank (KDB), the Act allowed discounted share offerings when selling shares to the 
general public, civil servants, or to state-owned enterprise (SOE) employees. Such 
shares were subject to a mandatory holding period specified in the Enforcement 
Degree (i.e., until the day of the next annual shareholders’ meeting). This measure 
obviously aimed to encourage dispersed share ownership, and was at least partly 
influenced by the criticism raised against the first-price auction when privatizing 
SOEs (Rhee et al. 2005). Most SOE privatizations under the first-price auction 
resulted in Chaebols acquiring significant ownership.  
Fourth, as another method to encourage dispersed share ownership of listed firms 
(or non-listed public firms), the Act also allowed share offerings to company 
employees, with an exception to the preemptive rights of existing shareholders.2 The 
fraction of such shares, however, could not be more than 10 percent of outstanding 
shares. Fifth, the Act exempted the income tax on dividends. 
 
2The term “public firm” is defined in the Corporate Income Tax Code (Article 22-3). According to the Code, a 
public firm is a listed firm or a non-listed firm that meets the following three conditions. First, the percentage of 
holdings by minority owners (shareholders individually holdings less than 3 percent of outstanding shares) must 
be at least 20 percent of outstanding shares. Second, the number of minority shareholders must be at least 30. 
Third, the fraction of holdings by any shareholder, together with his or her relatives defined in the Enforcement 
Decree, must be no more than 60 percent of outstanding shares. 
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3.2 Initial Public Offerings 
 
To encourage firms to go public, the Act gave tax and special depreciation benefits 
to listed firms (or non-listed public firms). Table 4 summarizes the corporate income 
tax rates applicable to public and nonpublic firms. In the highest income bracket, the 
two tax rates differ by 20 percentage points. With regard to depreciation, the Act 
permitted an extra 20 percent depreciation for listed (or non-listed public) firms. 
 
TABLE 4—CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES (PUBLIC VERSUS NON-PUBLIC) 
Income Ranges Public Firms Non-public Firms 
Below 1 million won 15% 25% 
Between 1 and 5 million won 20% 35% 
Above 5 million won 25% 45% 
Source: Rhee et al. (2005). 
 
 
Some individuals, however, raised concerns that the number of corporate 
blackmailers would increase with a greater number of minority shareholders.3 This 
led the Act to permit the chair of shareholders’ meeting to have the authority to 
preserve and maintain order. This meant that the chair would be able to stop any 
person from speaking, or order him removed, if the chair were to judge that the 
person is intentionally disturbing the orderliness of the meeting. 
 
3.3 Korea Investment Development Corporation 
 
The Act established the Korea Investment Development Corporation (KIDC), to 
underwrite newly offered shares, promote dispersed share ownership, and stabilize 
share prices. 4  Legally, the Corporation was a stock company, in which the 
government owned 50 percent of outstanding shares. Under its shareholders meeting, 
it had an Investment Review Committee that screened new offerings, underwrote 
government-owned shares, and set offering prices.  
The Act regarded the KIDC as a securities company and required it to be 
registered as one. The Act also permitted KIDC a wide scope of businesses: (i) 
securities underwriting, (ii) securities trading, (iii) public offerings and sales 
arrangements, (iv) stock price stabilization, (v) sales of government- or SOE-owned 
securities, (vi) research and advisory services to issuing firms, (vii) securities 
collateral loan business, and (viii) securities investment trust business. 
It is also important to note that the KIDC had the potential to mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem in the primary market. As a securities underwriter 
and agent with a mandate to stabilize newly offered shares, it had the potential to 
serve as a reputational intermediary. 
 
3Corporate blackmailers are unique to Korea and Japan. They usually extort money from or blackmail 
companies by threatening to publicly humiliate companies and their management. 
4In December 1972, the Korea Investment Development Corporation (KIDC) was renamed as the Korea 
Investment Corporation (KIC). The Korea Investment Corporation was established in July of 2005 as a sovereign 
wealth fund, and is not related to the KIDC established in December of 1968. 
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4. Outcomes and Evaluation 
 
The KIDC was launched in December of 1968 with a paid-in equity capital of 1.5 
billion won (authorized capital of 3 billion won). Shareholders include the 
government (500 million won), the KDB (5 million won), and other private sector 
participants (5 million won). Byung-June Lee was appointed as the KIDC’s first 
President. To convey the government’s strong determination to the public, it even 
named 1969 the “Year of Capital Market Development” and May 3rd as “Securities 
Day.” 
Despite such initial enthusiasm, the outcome was disappointing. From Table 5, one 
can observe that, between 1968 and 1971, market capitalization, the capital stock of 
listed firms, the number of listed firms, the increase in the paid-in capital, and the 
number of shareholders all increased, giving an impression that the government 
made some progress. However, the reality behind the figures was far different. First, 
most of the newly offered shares were acquired by banks. As a result, bank lending 
was merely replaced by bank equity investments, thereby perpetuating the same 
reliance on banks as before. Second, the firms that went public according to the 
definition set out in the Corporate Income Tax Code refused to be listed on the stock 
market. Note that the tax code did not distinguish between non-listed public firms 
and listed public firms when granting tax benefits, which led them to remain non-
listed (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1970. 5. 2).  
Third, the fraction of shares owned by small-scale investors (those holding less 
than 1,000 shares) increased only by 0.8 percentage points over a four-year period, 
suggesting that the government had failed to achieve its goal of promoting dispersed 
ownership. Not surprisingly, the amount of public offerings was also a merely 5.29 
billion won. Fourth, there were disguised public offerings during this period. In order 
to meet the conditions as a public firm, controlling shareholders of two different 
firms mutually exchanged their shares. By periodically trading the shares, they were 
even able to satisfy the requirements of a listed firm (Maeil Business Newspaper 
1970. 10. 15). As shown in Table 5, the trading volume was insubstantial. In 1971, 
the total number of shares traded accounted for only 30 percent of shares outstanding.  
 
TABLE 5—STOCK MARKET STATISTICS, 1968-1971 
 Unit 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Market Capitalization Million won 64,323 86,569 97,922 108,706 
Capital Stock Listed Million won 96,585 119,902 134,292 141,356 
No. of Listed Firms New 10 8 6 2 Cumulative 34 42 48 50 
Paid-in Capital Increase No. of Firms 10 6 13 7 Million won 20,317 5,983 6,225 2,090 
Public Offerings No. of Firms 2 12 9 4 Million won 160 2,211 2,068 850 
No. of Shareholders - 39,986 54,318 76,276 81,923 
Share Ownership by Small-
scale Investors % 2.03 1.91 2.74 2.83 
Yearly Turnover Yearly 0.67 0.70 0.49 0.29 
Notes: Small-scale investors refer to those holding less than 1,000 shares. Yearly turnover is measured as follows: 
(total number of shares traded per year / total number of shares outstanding at year-end). 
Source: Securities Market Yearly Statistics, 1972. 
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Such failure was predicted from the beginning (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1968. 11. 
12), given that stock returns were well below bank deposit rates, and because high 
inflation rates discouraged the general public from investing in the stock market. 
Experts at the time predicted that the public would instead invest in the real estate 
market. The 10 percent dividend yield guaranteed by statute was also judged to be 
too low by experts. The level may have been sufficient for the controlling 
shareholders to produce a healthy return on their investments, but it was insufficient 
for outside minority shareholders.   
Overall, the government’s IPO inducement policy of 1968 failed to achieve its 
policy goals. Nevertheless, it contributed to the Korean capital market in two ways. 
First, it greatly dissipated the stigma of the stock market as a place for gambling. 
Second, it created KIDC, which would later play an important role in developing the 
Korean capital market.5 
 
B. The IPO Promotion Act: A Coercive Approach (1972-1978) 
 
1. Background 
 
The Economic boom in the second half of the 1960s spread optimism among the 
Korean business community. The boom encouraged large Korean firms to increase 
their bank borrowings. Borrowing from banks, however, was not enough. To expand 
their businesses, these companies began to finance their activities through private 
loans. However, this strategy proved to be a mistake. The monthly interest rates on 
these private loans were very high, about 5 percent on average. Some loans were as 
high as 10 percent per month (Koh 2008). By 1972, many firms could no longer 
service their debts. The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) asked the government 
to take an emergency action. The government intervened, as requested. On August 3, 
1972, the government announced that it would freeze all the existing private loans to 
businesses, and later restructured their terms, which were greatly in favor of the 
borrowers. 
Policymakers who were involved in this Emergency Measure of August 8, 1972 
opined that Korean firms should make definitive changes to their capital structures.6 
As a direct result, the necessity to promote public offerings received renewed interest 
in Korea. Public offerings were also perceived as a way to socialize corporate 
ownership in Korea (Kim 2006). The failure of the IPO inducement policy in 1968, 
however, led policymakers to establish a more coercive approach. Undoubtedly, the 
political environment under the Yushin Regime made such a coercive approach 
possible.7  
 
5Korea Investment Development Corporation (KIDC) was the first institution that sold investment trust 
certificates (May 1970). When it was dissolved in 1977, its role and staff were transferred to the Securities 
Supervisory Board and Daehan Investment Trust Company.  
6For details on the Emergency Measure of August 8, 1972, see Kim (2002). The paper argues that the new 
IPO promotion policies were already conceived when preparing for the private debt freeze measure.   
7In October of 1972, after declaring a state of emergency, President Park dissolved the National Assembly and 
suspended the constitution. Soon the constitution was revised in a way that paved the way for President Park to 
take authoritarian and lifetime power without any limits on his power. This new regime is referred to as the Yushin 
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The much lower interest rates set after the Emergency Measure of August 8 
created an environment conducive to pursue an IPO promotion policy. Relatively 
high stock returns also attracted people to the stock market. This renewed interest in 
stock investments and the initial increase in the number of IPOs, however, were 
temporarily interrupted by the oil shock in late 1973.   
 
2. The Details of the Act  
 
By the time the Emergency Measure of August 8 was fully implemented, the 
Ministry of Finance (Minister Duk-Woo Nam) finished its preparation of the bill 
which would become the IPO Promotion Act.8 The Act was approved by the 
Emergency State Council on December 30, 1972 and came into effect on January 5, 
1973. The objectives set out in Article 1 of the Act were very similar to those written 
in the Capital Market Development Act. The Act aimed to promote IPOs, facilitate 
equity financing, improve the capital structure of firms, promote people’s ownership 
of stocks, and contribute to the nation’s economic development (Nam 2009). 
Although the two Acts were similar in terms of their main objectives, the 
approaches taken to execute them were very different. The Capital Market 
Development Act of 1968 took a passive approach, aimed at inducing voluntary IPOs 
through tax incentives. In contrast, the approach taken in the IPO Promotion Act of 
1972 was a coercive one, relying on government orders and penalties. Firms were 
unilaterally designated by the government to go public; if they did not comply, the 
government had the authority to penalize them by restricting bank lending. Such a 
coercive approach was only possible due to the new political environment under the 
Yushin Regime.  
 
2.1 IPO Review Committee 
 
The Act established the IPO Review Committee that would deliberate on and 
finalize policies necessary to implement the Act (Article 3). The committee was 
composed of 8 to 11 members. The ex officio members included the Prime Minister 
(who presided over the meetings), the Minister of Economic Planning Board (EPB), 
the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Industry and Trade, the Governor of the 
Bank of Korea, the President of the KIDC, and the President of the Korea Stock 
Exchange. In addition to these ex officio members, one to five civilians with 
knowledge and experience in securities matters were appointed as members by the 
President.9 
 
 
Regime. The word Yushin is the Korean pronunciation of the Japanese word Ishin, which means restoration. Ishin 
is used in Meiji Ishin, which refers to the chain of events that restored imperial rule to Japan in 1868. 
8In September of 1971, the Ministry of Finance established a new bureau exclusively for securities and 
insurance affairs. Mr. In-Kie Hong was appointed as the first Director-General of this bureau (September 1971 – 
August 1973). Mr. Hong was succeeded by Mr. Lee, Kun-Joong (August 1973 – May 1976). 
9According to Byung-Woo Koh, individual IPOs were authorized by the Assistant Minister of Financial 
Affairs at the Ministry of Finance. Mr. Koh served as the Assistant Minister of Financial Affairs from January of 
1975 to September of 1977. 
74 KDI Journal of Economic Policy MAY 2015 
2.2 Designation of Qualified Firms 
 
According to the Act, the Ministry of Finance reviewed a set of firms (known as 
target firms) and designated a subset (qualified firms) that would be given order by 
the Minister of Finance to go public (Article 4). Target firms included (i) firms that 
were approved under the Foreign Capital Inducement Act to receive foreign loans or 
import capital goods in excess of their capital (1 billion won, if capital is greater than 
1 billion won), (ii) firms that had borrowed from domestic financial institutions in 
amount more than 1 billion won, and (iii) firms which needed to become a public 
entity for the sake of Korea’s economic development. 
Qualified firms were those that met the following conditions: (i) equity capital in 
excess of 50 million won, (ii) two or more years of operation since establishment, (iii) 
dividend yields expected to be greater than 10 percent after an IPO, and (iv) shares 
expected to trade above par value. When giving IPO orders, it was also required that 
the Minister of Finance give instructions concerning the details of the offering. These 
details included (i) the number of shares that needed to be publically offered, (ii) 
upper ownership limit per shareholder (including related parties), (iii) offering terms, 
and (iv) the offering deadline. The Act set the upper ceiling of 51 percent as the 
restriction on ownership per shareholder.10 The Act could have set the upper limit to 
a lower amount, but concerns by company owners over losing corporate control 
resulted in the government setting it to slightly above 50 percent.  
To facilitate government’s document review, the Act gave Minister of Finance the 
power to request necessary information from subject firms, and to inspect their 
financial statements (Article 6). The Minister of Finance also had the authority to ask 
for cooperation from government agencies and other related organizations. These 
agencies and organizations had to oblige unless there was a clear reason not to 
(Article 7).  
To facilitate public offerings and achieve dispersed share ownership, the Act 
required the establishment of an organization that would act as a stand-by 
underwriter, and purchase unsubscribed shares, later reselling them in installments 
to the general public (Article 9). To encourage participation in this operation, the 
Act temporarily (1973-1976) exempted participating organizations from paying 
corporate income taxes on capital gains obtained within six months after the 
offering (Article 15). 
 
2.3 Incentives for IPO 
 
The Act gave firms a variety of economic incentives to go public. First, the Act 
permitted public or designated firms the opportunity to revalue their real estate assets 
annually, even if they were not directly used for operations. Normally, such real 
estate assets had not been eligible for asset revaluations. Moreover, according to the 
Act, revaluation gains were subject to a special tax rate of 27 percent, well below the 
normal rate of 40 percent (Article 12). Second, the Act gave a 50 percent tax 
 
10A year earlier (Dec. 28, 1971), the Corporate Income Tax Code was revised in the same direction. The upper 
ownership limit per shareholder was set to be 51 percent. Previously, it had been 60 percent.  
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exemption on dividend income to shareholders (together with related parties) who 
owned less than 30 percent of outstanding shares (Article 13).  
Third, if a designated firm had complied with the government order and went 
public, it was pardoned of previous tax evasion crimes, provided that it would correct 
its financial statements prior to the date the Act takes effect (1973. 1. 5) (Article 14). 
 
2.4 Penalties for Non-Compliance 
 
The penalties established in the Act were as provocative as the incentives. If a 
designated firm refused to comply, it faced the following penalties during its period 
of non-compliance: (i) the interests on debt borrowed from shareholders or 
management could not be expensed, (ii) entertainment and other similar costs could 
be expensed at a rate only half of other compliant firms, (iii) special depreciation 
privileges granted to firms with honest tax filing records could not be allowed, and 
(iv) a 20 percent increase in corporate income tax would be required. 
Second, the Act penalized not only non-complying firms, but also their 
shareholders. The shareholders would face a 20 percent increase in their general 
income tax payments. Probably the most effective tool, however, was the Minister of 
Finance’s power to ask financial institutions to limit their lending and other 
assistances to non-complying firms.     
 
3. Implementation of the Act 
 
3.1 IPO Review Committee during 1973-1974 
 
On March 10, 1973, the government formed the IPO Review Committee by 
appointing five civil members. The first meeting was held on March 22, presided 
over by Jong-Pil Kim, the Prime Minister. At this meeting, the Committee selected 
110 firms to request the submission of their financial statements by April 12. These 
firms were either (i) firms that had foreign debt of more than 5 million dollars, (ii) 
firms that had restructured its debt under the Emergency Measure of August 8 in the 
amount of more than 500 million won, or (iii) firms that had borrowed more than 1 
billion won from domestic financial institutions (DongA Daily Newspaper 1973. 5. 
22). 104 firms submitted their financial statements by the deadline, with four 
submitting statements after the deadline, and two not complying at all.  
On July 23, the IPO Review Committee meeting conducted its second meeting, 
and decided to add firms with restructured debt greater than 100 million won to the 
target list. This resulted in an additional 350 firms (Maeil Business Newspaper 1973. 
7. 23). They had to submit their financial statements by the end of August.11 At the 
same meeting, 40 out of 108 firms that had previously submitted their financial 
statements were identified as qualified firms. Among these 40 firms, 14 had already 
gone public, 12 were identified as firms for whom an IPO was feasible, and the 
 
11In 1973, the Ministry of Finance made a visit to Bovespa (Sao Paulo Stock Exchange). The visit was 
recommended by the head of United States Operations Mission (USOM). USOM was later renamed as USAID-K. 
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remaining 14 were regarded as unqualified. Public offering orders, however, were not 
issued at this time, with Prime Minister Jong-Pil Kim giving instructions that IPOs 
should be carried out voluntarily.   
The IPO Review Committee met two additional times, in September and 
November. No additional firms were added in the target list, nor were there any firms 
that received a public offering order from the government. By April 26 of the 
following year, the Ministry of Finance had completed its due diligence of 32 firms, 
which were asked to submit offering details, including number of shares to be offered, 
terms, and the offering date.  
 
3.2 Oil Shock of 1973 and the Slow Progress 
 
Table 6 summarizes the stock market performance during the period of 1971-1974. 
Thanks to rising stock prices up to 1973 (stock prices had peaked in July of 1972 at 
394), most stock market indicators were showing improvements during this time. 
Market capitalization, the capital stock of listed firms, the number of listed firms, the 
increase in the amount of paid-in capital, the number of shareholders, aggregate share 
holdings by small-scale investors (holding less than 1,000 shares), and turnover 
statistics all showed progress. This was by no means a coincidence. 1973 was also a 
year in which Korea grew by 14.8 percent in real terms.   
This upward trend, however, was interrupted by the oil shock that hit the economy 
near the end of 1973. Consequently, in 1974, only 26 firms were newly listed on the 
stock exchange. During 1973-74, in fact, there were firms that even experienced a 
decrease in capital or were delisted altogether.   
 
TABLE 6—STOCK MARKET STATISTICS, 1971-1974 
 Unit 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Stock Price Index 1972 = 100 -    227     311    297 
Market Capitalization Million won 108,706 245,981 426,247 532,824 
Capital Stock Listed Million won 141,357 174,339 251,620 381,343 
No. of Listed Firms New (Delist)      2      16   40 (2)   26 (2) Cumulative     50      66     104    128 
Paid-in Capital Increase No. of Firms      7      31      53     62 Million won   2,090  15,175  33,617  37,052 
Public Offerings No. of Firms      4      7     47     19 Million won    850   1,080  21,475  14,337 
No. of Shareholders -  81,923 103,266 199,999 199,613 
Share Ownership by Small-scale 
Investors % 2.83 3.37 5.94 4.91 
Yearly Turnover Yearly 0.30 0.43 0.53 0.39 
Economic Growth Rate Real GDP % 10.4 6.5 14.8 9.4 
Notes: Small-scale investors refer to those holding less than 1,000 shares. Yearly turnover is measured as follows: 
(total number of shares traded per year / total number of shares outstanding at year-end). 
Source: Securities Market Yearly Statistics (1975) and Bank of Korea (ECOS). 
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3.3 Special Presidential Order of May 29 
 
Due to the government’s measures to lower import tariffs, Korean firms endured 
the oil shock of 1973 without much difficulty. Firms did not make much progress in 
their IPOs, however, which caused President Park to intervene. Based on the advice 
by the Chief Secretary of Economic Affairs, President Park issued a special order to 
his cabinet on May 29, 1974, entitled the “Five Special Orders on Firms’ Public 
Offerings and Corporate Culture.”  
Stock price soared upon the news of the President’s special order, but the 
responses from firms were not encouraging. They were still concerned with the 
possibility that newly offered shares may not be fully purchased with, and the 
possibility of losing control over their businesses (Chosun Ilbo 1974. 5. 31).  
Amidst this stalemate, the government decided to ask for cooperation from Sung-
Kohn Kim, the head of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, hoping that if 
he decides to go public with Ssangyong Cement Industrial, it may trigger others to 
follow. Yong-Hwan Kim, the Chief Secretary of Economic Affairs, invited Chairman 
Kim to the Blue House and proposed a deal (Kim 2002). The decision to make this 
deal was not easy for Chairman Kim, as he had great concerns over losing corporate 
control. He nevertheless could not refuse the government’s request. On July 8 1974, 
Chairman Kim called a press conference and announced his plan for Ssangyong 
Cement Industrial’s IPO. 
 
3.4 IPO Supplementary Measures of August 8 
 
Despite such efforts, it remained rare for a key blue-chip firm within a group to go 
public. Firms that went public were mostly secondary firms within a group. To 
address this situation, the government on August 8 1975 announced its IPO 
Supplementary Measures.  
The Supplementary Measures of August 8 included a new set of target firms: (i) 
primary firms within a Chaebol group, (ii) the top 100 firm in terms of company size, 
(iii) firms with more than 3 million dollars of foreign debt, (vi) the top 100 exporting 
firm, (v) firms classified as a qualified firm according to the KIDC, or (vi) firms in 
the HCI sector.12   
 
3.5 Other Government Measures 
 
Besides the Supplementary Measures of August 8, there were other government 
policy measures that later greatly facilitated public offerings by firms. One was the 
Capital Market Preparation Measures, announced in June of 1974. This measure was 
designed to prepare the capital market for large public offerings by forming a 
syndicate of financial institutions that would purchase unsubscribed shares from 
issuers, later reselling them to the general public. KIDC and securities firms with 
 
12For the details pertaining to the promotion policy for heavy-equipment and chemical industries, see Kim 
(2011).  
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equity capital above 300 million won were the key participants. Besides underwriting, 
the Capital Market Preparation Measures included policies on securities savings, 
securities investment trusts, and employee stock ownership plans.  
In December of 1976, the Securities and Exchange Act also underwent a major 
revision. The revisions included the establishment of: (i) the Securities Management 
Commission (SMC) and the Securities Supervisory Board (SSB), (ii) a 10 percent 
ownership limit in listed firms13, (iii) the ex post management of listed firms, (iv) 
supplementary measures to improve corporate disclosures, and (v) measures to 
prevent insider trading.  
Related to corporate disclosure, the Act mandated firms to register at least one 
before their listings and required a number of disclosures. To prevent insider trading, 
the Act banned stock trading by company management and employees. The Act also 
mandated that company management, employees, and major shareholders (owning 
more than 10 percent) return their capital gains back to the company if the gains were 
obtained by selling (or purchasing) company shares within six month after their 
purchase (or sale).  
 
4. Outcome and Evaluation 
 
4.1 Outcome 
 
The government made public the list of qualified firms and their public offering 
schedules on October 6, 1975 and July 1, 1976. In 1975, it included 105 firms, from 
which 30 were strongly recommended to go public before the end of the year. In 
1976, the government added 101 firms to the list to go public between the second 
half of 1976 and the first half of 1977. Many firms, however, could not go public due 
to profitability - or capital structure -related reasons. Among the 46 firms designated 
to go public in 1976, only 20 complied. Sometimes, very profitable firms refused to 
go public during this time, the most noteworthy example being Hyundai 
Construction.14 On March 15, 1978, the Securities Supervisory Board organized a 
meeting with firms that were recommended to go public, strongly warning that if 
they did not comply, public offering orders would be issued, along with appropriate 
sanctions (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1978. 3. 15). 
  
 
13According to Article 200 of the Securities and Exchange Act, no shareholder was allowed to own more than 
10 percent of outstanding shares in a listed firm. Shareholders owning more than 10 percent of shares at the time 
of listing, however, were not subject to this rule.  
14The reason behind Hyundai Construction’s continued refusal to go public boils down to its offering price. 
Hyundai Construction, which became a global player in 1976 by winning Saudi Arabia’s Jubail port contract 
(worth 960 million dollars), wanted to offer its shares at 7,000 won per share. This was significantly higher than 
the 3,000 won suggested by the government (Maeil Business Newspaper 1977. 6. 4). Despite such disagreements, 
in 1977, the government and Hyundai Construction struck a deal to go public. However, this decision was 
overturned at the last moment when Chairman Ju-Yung Chung succeeded in persuading President Park that 
Hyundai Construction would build five general hospitals around the country if it could remain private. Chairman 
Chung calculated that investors would benefit by 50 billion won if Hyundai Construction shares were to be offered 
below its true value. He promised that the same amount of money would be used to build hospitals. The origin of 
the Asan Medical Center can also be traced back to this promise. The Asan Medical Center is now one of the most 
prestigious hospitals in the country (Koh 2008). 
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TABLE 7—STOCK MARKET STATISTICS, 1974-1978 
 Unit 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Stock Price Index 1975 = 100 105.0 139.4 146.8 178.2 207.2 
Market Capitalization Billion won 533 916 1,436 2,351 2,892 
Capital Stock Listed Billion won 381 643 1,153 2,117 2,959 
No. of Listed Firms New (Delist) 26 (2) 62 87 49 33 Cumulative 128 189 274 323 356 
Paid-in Capital Increase No. of Firms 62 68 81 97 148 Million won 37,052 82,929 101,941 141,859 285,201 
Public Offerings No. of Firms 19 62 87 49 33 Million won 14,337 39,875 74,005 44,113 41,521 
No. of Shareholders - 199,613 290,678 568,105 395,275 963,049 
Share Ownership by Small-
scale Investors % 4.91 5.31 3.58 3.38 6.59 
Yearly Turnover Yearly 0.39 0.51 0.51 0.71 0.56 
Economic Growth Rate Real GDP % 9.4 7.3 13.5 11.8 10.3 
Notes: Small-scale investors refer to those holding less than 1,000 shares. Yearly turnover is measured as follows: 
(total number of shares traded per year / total number of shares outstanding at year-end). 
Source: Securities Market Yearly Statistics (1979) and Bank of Korea (ECOS). 
 
 
Although some firms refused to go public, overall, the government’s effort was 
deemed a success. Table 7 shows the development of the Korean stock market during 
the period of 1974-1978. One can see that the number of listed firms and the amount 
of paid-in capital increased significantly, along with a rising stock market index. In 
September 1976, the government celebrated its efforts in raising more than 1 trillion 
won in equity capital during a one-year period. During the three-year period between 
1975 and 1977, nearly 300 firms went public (Koh 2008). Low interest rates and 
high economic growth rate were important factors behind this growth. In 1975, 
dividend yields for listed firms averaged 23.3 percent, whereas the time deposit rate 
was only 15 percent (Rhee et al. 2005). Korea also experienced three consecutive 
years of two-digit real GDP growth rate during the period of 1976-1978.  
 
4.2 Evaluation 
 
Although the government threatened on a number of different occasions that it 
would penalize non-compliant firms, it never sanctioned any company. Nevertheless, 
the government made significant achievements in increasing the number of listed 
firms. The success factors can be summarized as follows. First, the low interest rates 
that prevailed during this period contributed most to this success. With relatively high 
stock returns and dividend yields, investors were attracted to the stock market. With a 
much greater investors’ base, large-scaled public offerings were placed successfully 
without much difficulty. On top of this, the influx of dollar receipts from the 
construction boom in the Middle East resulted in an expansionary monetary policy 
and a stock market boom.  
Second, rapid economic growth was also crucial. Facing increased demand, firms 
had to raise new capital and were motivated to go public voluntarily. As mentioned 
earlier, the period during which the number of listed firms increased the most 
overlaps Korea’s two-digit real GDP growth rates for three consecutive years (1976-
1978). Third, President Park’s incessant and unwavering support was also crucial. 
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The Special Order of May 29 and occasional instructions at monthly economic 
development meetings were just a few examples of his support. Without his support, 
Korea’s IPO promotion policy would not have been pursued consistently over the 
five-year period (1973-1978).  
Fourth, the government‘s timely introduction of various securities-related 
measures also helped alleviate the concerns of company owners and investors. For 
example, the 10 percent ownership limit greatly alleviated the concern over losing 
corporate control. The underwriting syndicate, formed to provide firm-commitment 
underwriting, helped to absorb large-scale public offerings. Mandatory registration 
and the prior disclosure of financial statements alleviated investors’ concerns over 
firms’ lack of transparency.  
An interesting way to understand the policy efforts in the 1970s is by looking at 
them from the perspective of mitigating information asymmetry, and preventing 
adverse selection problems. The challenge faced by the Korean government in the 
1960s and ‘70s was to overcome these problems without a good disclosure rule or 
securities law. The option taken in the 1960s was to set up the KIDC, which would 
serve as a reputational intermediary, which did not work out as intended. The policy 
measures taken in the 1970s were an improvement over those in the 1960s in the 
sense that the government was directly involved in differentiating between high and 
low quality firms. By going through the financial statements and designating 
qualified firms, the government served as a trustworthy screening agency. However, 
the offering prices set by the government were too low for high quality firms. As a 
result, they refused to go public, as in the case of Hyundai Construction. This 
problem was partially resolved in the 1980s when the offering price were allowed to 
be set higher than the par value, which led high quality firms to offer their shares in 
the market voluntarily.   
Another interesting question is whether this coercive and interventionist approach 
helped. My investigation shows that such an approach partially contributed to the 
IPO boom during the late 1970s. By being directly involved in differentiating 
between high and low quality firms, the government greatly mitigated the 
information asymmetry problem. Also, the incentives it offered and penalties it 
threatened to impose aligned the interests of both the government and the designated 
firms. Their effects were, however, heavily influenced by improvements in 
macroeconomic conditions. Before the economic boom, the number of IPOs 
increased only moderately. Nonetheless, when the economy boomed, the number of 
IPOs also accelerated.  
The government’s success in increasing the number of IPOs was tarnished by a 
bubble that formed in 1978. With the construction boom in the Middle East, 
construction companies became overly subscribed by investors, while other sectors 
experienced under-subscription (DongA Daily Newspaper 1978. 6. 7). In 1976, the 
portion taken up by construction firms in the total number of public offerings and the 
increase in capital were respectively 9.7 percent and 1.4 percent. These 
corresponding figures increased to 63.9 percent and 25.4 percent in 1978 (Rhee et al. 
2005). Although many construction firms went public during the bubble years, 
interestingly, the top-ranked firms did not. Hyundai Construction is a good example. 
The government failed to detect and correct the imbalances that emerged in the 
stock market by the second half of 1978. There were too many shares being offered, 
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compared to the size of the stock market’s investor base. Coupled with the 
government’s tight monetary policy to fight inflation and a second oil shock, the stock 
market soon crashed, failing to recover for many years afterward (Rhee et al. 2005). 
 
C. The Equity Offering Expansion Policies in the 1980s 
 
1. Background 
 
1.1 Stock Market Stagnation and the Need to Expand the Role of Government 
 
The stock market stagnated for many years after the 1978 bubble burst. Firms 
started to rely again on bank lending and private loans. Naturally, firms’ debt-to-
equity ratio deteriorated. Amidst this backdrop, in October of 1983, Man-Jae Kim 
became Finance Minister. Unlike his predecessors, he had a deep understanding of 
and keen interest in capital markets, and he was very active in developing the market 
during his tenure.  
Government policymakers, including Minister Kim, thought that the financial 
sector was lagging behind the real industrial sector. Undoubtedly, this had to do with 
twenty years of financial repression during the period of government-led 
interventionist industrial policies. However, within the financial sector, the stock 
market was in a worse condition. The financial system was considerably bank-
centered. To diversify external financing sources and to improve the capital structure, 
there was a strong need initially to normalize and then to expand the capital market.  
It is important here to note that the nation-wide resource mobilization, which was 
an important policy goal behind capital market development policies in the 1970s, 
did not play a key role during this particular period. 
 
1.2 The Three Lows and the Economic Boom 
 
During the second half of 1980s, Korean economy enjoyed an extremely favorable 
external environment, what has been termed the Three Lows, referring to low 
international interest rates, a low value of the Korean won, and a low price of crude 
oil. With low international interest rates, the debt service burden on foreign 
borrowings dropped significantly. A stronger Japanese Yen against the US dollar, a 
result of the Plaza Accord, made Korean export goods relatively inexpensive. Lower 
crude oil price significantly lowered production costs as well. Consequently, Korea’s 
current account turned in to a surplus after many years of chronic deficit. The real 
GDP growth rate, which was 9.9 percent and 7.5 percent, respectively in 1984 and 
1985, increased to 12.2 percent, 12.3 percent, and 11.7 percent, respectively in 1986, 
1987, and 1988.15  
 
15There were two occasions when Korea experienced three consecutive years of double-digit real GDP 
growth rate. One occurred in the second half of the 1970s (76-78) and the other was during the second half of the 
1980s (86-88). 
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Such an economic boom undoubtedly helped the government’s policy to expand 
equity offerings. Faced with a greater demand for their products, firms had to 
increase their capital expenditures. The resulting stock market boom meant that they 
could raise equity at a lower cost. There were also plenty of investors willing to 
purchase newly issued shares. Also, with rising per capita income and wealth, a 
greater number of people participated in the stock market.  
 
1.3 Market Opening and Privatization 
 
Capital market internationalization was first contemplated in January of 1981, 
when government announced its Long-Term Plan on Capital Market 
Internationalization. In preparation for the opening of Korea’s market, it became very 
important to enlarge the size of the stock market.16 The need to privatize SOEs also 
made it necessary to expand the stock market. For the government to sell shares 
directly in the stock market, it was deemed very important to have a well-developed 
primary market.   
 
2. The Policy Details 
 
The equity offering expansion policy in the 1980s, the subject matter of this 
section, refers to a series of policy measures announced and implemented during the 
period of 1983 to 87, either to encourage public offerings or to expand the investor 
base. The policymakers at the Ministry of Finance believed that they should give 
priority to the former over the latter, if they were forced to choose between the two. 
They thought that once blue-chip shares were offered, this naturally attracted investor 
demand, i.e., supply essentially creating demand. Following this logic, the 
government focused on policy measures that would either induce or coerce blue-chip 
firms to offer their shares in the open market.  
The most comprehensive package of measures to expand equity offerings was 
announced in June of 1987. First, so that blue-chip firms would offer their shares, the 
government devised a number of incentives for them. They included (i) relaxing the 
market-price share offering rule, (ii) strengthening tax benefits, (iii) relaxing asset 
revaluation requirements, (iv) relaxing the cap on corporate bond issuances and stock 
dividends, (v) allowing for the issuance of exchange bonds and participation bonds, 
and (vi) relaxing the cap on the issuance of preferred shares. 
Second, to enlarge the stock market’s investors’ base, the government introduced a 
number of measures, including (i) privileged access to IPO stocks given to holders of 
long-term savings accounts, (ii) strengthened regulation pertaining to insider trading, 
and (iii) supplementary measures to improve company disclosures. To support 
employee stock ownership associations, they were given 20 percent preemptive 
rights over publically offered shares. Previously, these associations had 10 percent 
 
16Market opening was carried out in a gradual manner. First, foreigners were allowed to invest indirectly 
through country funds listed on the NYSE (e.g., Korea Fund established in August of 1984). Second, foreigners’ 
direct equity investment in the Korea Stock Exchange was allowed in January of 1992. Finally, limits on foreign 
ownership were completely lifted in May of 1998.  
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preemptive rights. Third, the government designated firms in nationally important 
industries (hereafter “public interest firms”) and came up with ways to protect these 
entities from takeovers, including ownership limits and restrictions on foreign 
acquisitions.  
Most of the measures announced in June were incorporated into the Capital 
Market Development Act, revised on November 28. Also, the IPO Promotion Act 
was repealed and merged into the revised Capital Market Development Act. With the 
repeal of the IPO Promotion Act, the term ‘IPO order’ was also replaced with the 
term ‘IPO recommendation’.17 The key contents of the revised Capital Market 
Development Act can be summarized as follows. 
First, the government had the power to recommend IPO or SEO, according to the 
criteria (regarding size of capital and profitability) outlined in the Enforcement 
Decree. For non-compliant firms, the government also had the power to refuse the 
receipt of their public offering applications for a pre-specified period of time 
(Articles 3 and 5). 
Second, the revised Act raised the limits on the dividends that a company could 
pay in the form of shares, from 50 percent to 100 percent of the total amount of 
dividends (Article 8). The Act also relaxed the ceiling on the issuance of convertible 
bonds (CBs) and bonds with warrants (BWs). The converted shares and exercised 
shares were excluded from the amount of issuance (Article 11). 
Third, the revised Act also introduced provisions that facilitated the sale of 
government-owned shares. For example, shares were allowed to be sold to the 
general public with no limitations, provided that doing so would help to disperse 
share ownership (Article 12). The Act also allowed government-owned shares to be 
sold to employee share ownership associations at a discount; in addition, employees 
would be allowed to pay for them in installments (Article 13). The Act also allowed 
the government to limit eligible acquirers and the maximum number of shares they 
would be able to acquire (Article 14). 
Fourth, the revised Act introduced provisions to strengthen employee stock 
ownership associations. For example, dividends from firms in nationally important 
industries could be paid out, in full or in part, to employee stock ownership 
associations (Article 15). Also, the preemptive rights given to employee stock 
ownership associations were raised from 10 percent to 20 percent of newly offered 
shares (Article 17). Listed firms were allowed to hold treasury stocks for a year. if 
they were purchased to pay out bonuses to employee stock ownership associations.  
Fifth, for firms operating in nationally important industries, the Act restricted, for 
national security reasons, shareholders’ book inspection rights (Article 24). 
 
  
 
17Although the Act used a softer term, it did not mean the government was taking a softer approach. In reality, 
the IPO recommendations in the ‘80s were no different from IPO orders in the 1970s.   
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3. Outcomes and Evaluation 
 
3.1 Outcomes 
 
In the beginning, not all firms were enthusiastic about public offerings. For 
example, only 40 out of the 59 firms (11 Chaebol member firms and 44 non-Chaebol 
firms) that received IPO recommendations on April 29 1986 from the Securities 
Supervisory Board, submitted their IPO plans by the May 20 deadline (Maeil 
Business Newspaper 1986. 4. 29, 1986. 5. 21). Nineteen firms refused to comply, 
despite threats of bank loan restrictions. By October of 1988, only five out of 59 
firms designated in 1986, 16 out of 77 firms designated in 1987, and six out of 15 
firms designated in 1988 went public (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1988. 10. 24).  
 
TABLE 8—STOCK MARKET STATISTICS, 1985-1989 
 Unit 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
KOSPI 1980 = 100 139.53 161.40 264.82 532.04 919.61 
Market Capitalization Billion won 6,570 11,994 26,172 64,543 95,477 
Capital Stock Listed Billion won 4,665  5,649  7,591 12,212 21,212 
No. of Listed Firms New (Delist) 11 (5)  17 (4)   35  115   124 Cumulative  342 355  389  502   625 
Paid-in Capital Increase No. of Firms   60 110  178  298   274 Billion won  260 798 1,656 6,721 11,125 
Public Offerings No. of Firms   11  16   44  112   135 Billion won   35  43  244 1,049  3,545 
No. of Shareholders - 772 1,410 3,102 8,541 19,013 
Share Ownership by Small-
scale Investors % 9.76 13.27 20.12 24.21 23.74 
Yearly Turnover Yearly 0.72 1.11 1.30 1.54 1.12 
Economic Growth Rate Real GDP % 7.5 12.2 12.3 11.7 6.8 
Notes: Small-scale investors refer to those holding less than 1,000 shares. Yearly turnover is measured as follows: 
(total number of shares traded per year / total number of shares outstanding at year-end). 
Source: Securities Market Yearly Statistics (1989) and Bank of Korea (ECOS).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: THE NUMBER OF LISTED FIRMS, 1963-1993 
Source: Securities Market Yearly Statistics. 
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Occasionally, the Securities Supervisory Board summoned executives from non-
complying firms in order to pressure them to go public.  
The situation changed in later years. As shown in Table 8, the number of newly 
listed firms, which was only 35 in 1987, jumped to 115 in 1988 and 124 in 1989. 
Figure 1 shows the number of listed firms from 1963 to 1993. One can easily 
visualize that there were two IPO waves, one during the late 1970s and the second 
during the late 1980s.  
There were also increases in paid-in capital and public offerings. As shown in 
Table 8, there were increases of approximately 4.9 trillion won of public offerings 
and 20.6 trillion won increase of paid-in capital during the period of 1985-1989. The 
introduction of market-price share offering greatly contributed to this increase. Other 
stock market indicators improved as well. During the four-year period between 1985 
and 1989, the number of stock investors, the KOSPI, and the amount of listed capital 
stocks increased respectively by 24.6, 6.6, and 4.5 times. During the same time 
period, turnovers of listed shares (0.72 → 1.12) and the percentage of shares held by 
small-scale investors (holding less than 1,000 shares) increased respectively by 9.76 
and 23.74 percent.  
The composition of external financing also improved over time. In 1988, the 
fraction of equity financing accounted for 39 percent. This was in great contrast to 
the level of only 8 percent in 1968. With the increase in equity financing, the capital 
structure also improved. Debt-to-equity ratio which was 462 percent in 1980 dropped 
to 260 percent by 1989. Also, the interest coverage ratio, which was less than 100 
percent in 1980 jumped to 162 percent in 1986.  
In 1988 and 1989, it was not uncommon to see firms offering shares at high 
premiums. For example, Saehan Media and Daeduck Industrial offered their shares 
respectively at 500 and 300 percent premiums. These shares were also correspondingly 
oversubscribed by 10.5:1 and 45:1 (Rhee et al. 2005). Facing favorable market 
conditions, firms went public and increased their paid-in capital voluntarily, and there 
was no need for the government to exert any pressure. In contrast, the government 
had to become stricter in its screening process of firms that had applied to go public. 
The second half of 1980s also witnessed an increase in preferred share issuances. 
Preferred shares became popular among firms that did not want to dilute the shares 
held by their controlling families. Stock investors also did not object to investing in 
them, as they did not prioritize voting rights. The very first preferred share issuance 
was accomplished by Oriental Brewery in June of 1986. The issuance of preferred 
shares, which accounted for only 1 percent of all paid-in capital increases in 1987 
jumped to 36 percent by 1989 (Rhee et al. 2005). 
However, preferred shares issued in those years diffed from those that have been 
allowed since 1996. Pre-1996 preferred shares had dividend yields which were one 
percent higher than those of common shares. Although dividend yields were higher 
than those of common shares, these figures fluctuated over time. Post-1996 preferred 
shares, on the other hand, provided a fixed dividend yield. In some sense, pre-1996 
preferred shares were similar to non-voting common shares. With the revision of the 
Commercial Code in 1996, the issuance of such preferred shares is now banned. 
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3.2 Evaluation 
 
The success in expanding share offerings in the second half of 1980s is, to a large 
extent, attributable to the aforementioned ‘Three Lows’ and the resulting economic 
boom. Firms, facing increased demand for their products and recognizing the need to 
raise more capital, became more inclined to go public or increase their paid-in capital. 
With higher income and wealth, a greater percentage of the population became stock 
investors, thereby expanding the stock investor base we well.  
The government also played an important role. Two measures were noteworthy in 
particular. The first of these was the liberalization of offering prices at the time of an 
IPO. The second was the introduction of market-price share offerings for listed firms. 
The regulations on IPO offering price, on which restrictions had been considerably 
relaxed in April of 1987, were completely liberalized in June of 1988 (Rhee et al. 
2005). Given this degree of liberalization, many firms were able to offer their shares 
at premiums. As a result, the cost of equity capital fell significantly, from 24.3 
percent during the period of 1982-1983 to 9.3 percent during the period of 1986-
1990 (Rhee et al. 2005). 
The rise in paid-in capital was attributable to market-price share offerings, which 
were, in return, attributable to increasing demand for stocks. Firms also benefited by 
retaining the difference between market price and par value. This difference was 
classified as a part of book equity referred to as capital surplus reserves.  
In the beginning, the government allowed market-price share offerings only under 
limited circumstances. However, soon thereafter, it began to require it for all firms, 
provided that their share price was 10 percent above par value (February 1987). This 
action was prompted to combat distortion in the market, arising when investors 
preferred to purchase distressed firms that were offering shares at par value over 
blue-chip firms offering shares at market price. In September 1989, the government 
removed all of the remaining restrictions on market-price share offerings (Rhee et al. 
2005). The maximum discount rate applied to market price was also lowered from 50 
percent in 1987 to 10 percent in 1989. Market-price share offering, as a percentage of 
total paid-in capital, increased from 4-6 percent during the period of 1984-1985 to 
100 percent by 1989. The average premium (over par value) also increase from 11 
percent in 1986 to 340 percent by 1989.  
Overall, the government’s share offering expansion policy was a success, but was 
not without problems. First, share offerings increased in the late 1980s, 
disproportionately exceeding their demand. KOSPI, which peaked around the period 
of March-August 1989, nosedived continuously until it hit the bottom in July of1992. 
A number of individuals who had invested with borrowed money committed suicide 
out of despair. Of course, it was somewhat inevitable for share prices to drop after 
public offerings, as firms generally offer shares when their share prices are peaking. 
This, however, does not mean that the government is helpless and should not be held 
accountable. To prevent a hard landing, it should closely monitor the market, and if 
necessary, preemptively intervene in the primary market by limiting the amount of 
share offerings, or inducing greater demand for stocks. This was what the 
government did when it announced a stock market stabilization plan in November of 
1989. However, it was too late to prevent the downfall.  
Second, controlling shareholders were criticized for intentionally diluting the value 
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of their company shares before their IPOs, thereby reaping capital gains afterwards. 
This scheme worked in the following way. First, controlling shareholders 
significantly increases the number of shares they hold, e.g., by reclassifying asset 
revaluation reserves as capital stock. The number of new shares existing shareholders 
receive equals the amount of reserves that had been reclassified divided by par value. 
If per share net asset value is greater than the par value, existing shareholders make a 
capital gain. However, per share net asset value itself falls after the reclassification. 
This is so because the total number of outstanding shares increases without any new 
capital injection. This results in a capital loss for the existing shareholders exactly 
offsetting the initial capital gain. In other words, reclassification per se does not 
result in any net gain to the existing shareholders.  
It makes a major difference, however, when the post-IPO share prices remain high, 
regardless of how many pre-IPO share issuances there were. With a stock-buying 
spree, this was the market environment in the late 1980s. Firms were able to offer 
shares at 300-400 percent premiums, regardless of their pre-IPO share issuances. As 
a result, the existing shareholders, mostly Chaebol families, reaped huge capital gains. 
A numerical example can make this point clear. 
Suppose there is a private firm with a net asset value of 1 billion won. If there are 
100 thousand outstanding shares, the per-share net asset value is 10 thousand won. 
For simplicity’s sake assume that the founder owns 100 percent of these shares. Par 
value per share is fixed at 5 thousand won. 
Suppose now this firm revalues its assets and the net asset value of this firm 
increases to 1.5 billion won. On the right-hand side of the company’s balance sheet, 
the shareholder equity is now divided into capital stock (1 billion won) and reserves 
(0.5 billion won). The per-share net asset value is now 15 thousand won. The total 
value of shares held by the founder is 1.5 billion won (15,000 x 100,000). 
Now suppose the firm increases the number of outstanding shares by reclassifying 
asset revaluation reserves as capital stock. Capital stock now has a value of 1.5 
billion won and the number of outstanding shares reaches 200 thousand (= existing 
100 thousand + 0.5 billion divided by par value, 5 thousand won). This means that 
the per-share net asset value is 7,500 won (= 1.5 billion divided by 200 thousand 
shares). The share value is diluted from 15,000 won to 7,500 won, but the total value 
of the shares held by the founder remains at 1.5 billion won.  
However, let us suppose now there is a bubble in the market and that the IPO 
offering price will be set at 20,000 won regardless of the pre-IPO share issuance. In 
the absence of pre-IPO share issuance, the post-IPO value of the shares would be 
worth 2 billion won (= 20,000 x 100,000). However, with a pre-IPO share issuance, 
the post-IPO value of shares would be worth 4 billion won (= 20,000 x 200,000). 
Third, the introduction of preferred shares was a violation of one-share, one-vote 
principle, as the preferred shares that were introduced were more akin to non-voting 
common shares. In effect, the government approved a de facto dual class equity 
system. Consequently, chaebol families were able to have control rights well above 
their cash flow rights. However, surprisingly, there was hardly any opposition to the 
concept of preferred shares initially. Problems with this system, however, gradually 
emerged. In late 1989, controlling shareholders dumped their preferred share 
holdings, which triggered a further share price drop of these shares (Rhee et al. 2005). 
These shareholders did not, however, dump common shares, in an obvious attempt to 
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retain control. Incidents of preferred shares being used for stock price manipulation 
also later emerged. Any new issuance of problematic preferred shares was finally 
outlawed in 1996, through the revisions to the Commercial Code in November of 
1995. 
 
4. Implications for Developing Countries 
 
The lessons that can be drawn from the second half of the 1980s are very similar to 
those mentioned in the previous section. As before, the macroeconomic situation was 
the most decisive factor. Massive public offerings would not have been possible 
without the Three Lows, and the resulting economic boom. If policymakers from 
developing countries wish to induce more equity offerings, they should concentrate 
their efforts during a stock market boom. 
Second, it should be noted that an economic boom alone is not sufficient in and of 
itself. The government must take timely measures to remove obstacles that may be 
hindering equity offerings. In Korea, there were two important measures that served 
such a purpose: the liberalization of IPO offering prices and the introduction of 
market-price share offerings by listed firms. 
Third, in order to change firms’ perception of the stock market, it is important to 
engage in continuous education and public campaigns. In the 1960s and ‘70s, the 
stock market was perceived as a place for gambling. By the second half of 1980s, 
capital market was well-recognized by firms as a source for the raising of long-term 
capital.  
Fourth, it is important ensure that the magnitude of public offerings does not 
exceed their demand. If it does, the government should abandon their yearly listing 
targets and try to restrict share offerings. To a certain extent, an economic boom is 
not unlike a double-edged sword. It induces new share offerings while concurrently, 
bringing a stock price bubble that attracts inexperienced and naïve investors into the 
stock market. When the bubble inevitably bursts, it leaves many damaged investors 
behind, some deep in debt.  
Fifth, the government’s coercive approach did not make much of a difference 
either way. 18  As discussed earlier, the number of newly listed firms closely 
followed real GDP growth rate or the stock price index. During a recessionary 
economy, however, firms refused to go public even in the presence of government 
pressure.    
 
III. Other Supplementary Policies 
 
The primary market, in which firms offer shares, is closely intertwined with the 
secondary market, where those shares are traded among investors. If share prices are 
set inadequately or transaction costs are too high in the secondary market, firms will 
 
18Although the political system had been democratized in the second half of the 1980s, the government was 
able to use coercive measures, such as restricting bank loans, because most financial institutions were still under 
government control.  
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have difficulty discovering favorable offering prices, and investors will face liquidity 
constraints. An advanced capital market is one in which both markets are well-
developed. In Sections 1 and 2 of this Chapter, a number of policies that shaped the 
secondary market in the 1970s and 80s are outlined. 
It is also clear that the primary market cannot be enlarged simply by increasing the 
supply of shares. There should be a commensurate increase in the investor base of the 
stock market. In the absence of a wide investors’ base, the supply of, and the demand 
for, shares would show a great imbalance, ultimately hindering the development of 
the stock market. Since the 1960s, the Korean government has made a series of 
efforts to expand the stock market’s investor base. In Section 3 of this Chapter, I 
cover the employee’s stock ownership plan. 
 
A. The Introduction of Regular-Way Transaction and  
the June 3rd Measure 
 
1. Background 
 
Up until 1969, the most popular means of share transaction was the clearing 
transaction system. This was the case during the Daehan Stock Exchange years and 
even after the Korea Stock Exchange was established in 1963. 19  Clearing 
transactions were like today’s futures transactions. A buyer (seller) promises to pay 
(receive) a certain price today but makes the actual payment (delivery) at a later date 
within one or two months. Also, the buyer and the seller can enter opposite 
transactions, thereby canceling their initial positions (two-sided orders). In this case, 
there would be no actual delivery of shares. The transaction was settled by paying or 
receiving the difference between the two contracted share prices. The exchange 
required margins from both parties. As opposed to clearing transactions, a cash 
transaction requires all aspects of a trade, including the delivery of payments, to be 
finalized on the same date. 
Because the transaction required only a small margin, clearing transactions were 
often used for speculative reasons, sometimes resulting in speculative bubbles. Two 
episodes during this era are noteworthy, one in 1959 and the other in 1962. In those 
years, clearing transactions accounted for 80-90 percent of all trading volume.  
The 1959 incident took place when speculators amassed Daehan Stock Exchange 
shares, betting on the possibility that it would be reorganized as a stock company, 
and that investment certificates would be exchanged with shares. The stock price 
jumped from 39 chon in February to 90 chon in May of 1959. Chon was the currency 
unit used before the introduction of won by the June 1962 currency reform. 
 
19The Daehan Stock Exchange existed from March of 1956 to December of 1962. The Korea Stock Exchange 
(KSE) existed from January of 1963 to December of 2004. It is important to note the nature of their legal entities. 
The Daehan Stock Exchange was initially not a stock company, but was able to issue investment certificates that 
were traded like stocks in the secondary market. Three months after the enactment of the Securities and Exchange 
Act in January of 1962, the Daehan Stock Exchange became a joint stock corporation. However, a speculative 
bubble, which burst during the first half of 1962, led Daehan to be reorganized into a government-run, non-profit 
corporation in 1963. It was also renamed as the Korea Stock Exchange. In 1988, it was privatized and reorganized 
again as a membership organization. Its successor, the Korea Exchange (KRX) is a joint stock company. 
90 KDI Journal of Economic Policy MAY 2015 
During the period of March-May of 1962, speculators again amassed Daehan 
Stock Exchange shares. This time, it was triggered by rumors that the stock exchange 
would complete a massive capital increase. The share price of 9.2 hwan (equivalent 
to 100 chon) in March jumped to 42.5 hwan in April. The trading volume of Daehan 
Stock Exchange shares also increased dramatically, representing 52.7 percent of the 
total trade volume by April. The Daehan Stock Exchange was criticized for its lack of 
timely intervention. A conflict of interest problem was also noted because Daehan 
Stock Exchange managers were also its shareholders, which made them 
unenthusiastic about stabilizing the stock market.  
With a rising stock price, investors that took a short position were unable to make 
their payments. The stock exchange was also unable to make the required payments 
on behalf of the sellers. Ministry of Finance stepped in and pressured the Bank of 
Korea to extend securities loans to the stock exchange. Chang-Soon Yoo, governor of 
the BOK, refused to cooperate, and resigned on May 26. The BOK ended up 
extending a loan of 33 billion hwan by June 1. 
The stock market speculation in 1962, however, cannot be solely attributed to the 
clearing transaction system. Investigations in later years revealed that Jong-Pil Kim, 
then serving as the head of the Korean CIA, created the speculative environment in 
order to fund and launch the Democratic Republican Party (Hankyoreh 2005. 3. 1). 
Kim instructed Korean CIA to give 980 million hwan to Eung-Sang Yoon, who, in 
return, established three securities firms that purchased massive amounts of Daehan 
Stock Exchange shares, which in turn triggered the bubble. Yoon was able to provide 
6.7 billion hwan to Jong-Pil Kim from these investments. 
 
2. Detailed Contents 
 
2.1 The Adoption of Regular-Way Transactions 
 
On February 1 1969, the Ministry of Finance (Minister: Jong-Yeul Hwang) 
repealed the clearing transaction system, adopting the regular-way transaction system. 
Under the new system, a trade had to be settled on the following day. One day after 
the contract, the buyer had to complete payments and the seller had to deliver the 
shares. Certain exceptions were allowed, some of which resembled the old clearing 
transaction system. If one party failed to settle on the following day, the settlement 
period was allowed to be extended, provided that both parties pay margins, and the 
party which failed to complete the transaction pays a small postponement fee 
(Kyunghyang Shinmun 1971. 2. 4).20  
This delayed settlement option, coupled with a 30 percent margin requirement, 
enabled investors to replicate futures trading, even without entering opposite 
transactions (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1971. 2. 4).21 As an example, consider two 
investors, A (buyer) and B (seller), who wish to trade 2,000 shares of the Korea 
Securities Finance Corporation (KSFC) on January 1 at 800 won per share. Once 
 
20In the beginning, the settlement period was allowed to be extended for 30 days. Later in July 1969, as a 
measure to boost up the stock market, it was relaxed to 60 days.   
21In October 1969, the government lowered the margin requirement from 40 percent to 30 percent for Korea 
Securities Finance Corporation shares.  
VOL. 37 NO. 2    Korea’s Capital Market Promotion Policies: IPOs and Other Supplementary Policy Experiences  91 
they deposit a margin of 480,000 won (= 0.3 x 800 x 2,000) at the Korea Stock 
Exchange, they can enter a de facto futures position. If share prices were to rise to 
1,000 won by January 10, investor B would receive 80,000 won (= 480,000 – 
400,000) from the Exchange, while investor A would receive 880,000 won (= 
480,000 + 400,000). 
Sometimes positions escalated to alarming levels. A good example of this excess 
was speculation involving the shares of Korea Securities Finance Corporation (KSFC) 
in November of 1969. One group of investors took a long position, while the other 
took a short position. Each party tried to enlarge its position to influence the share 
price in its favor (Maeil Business Newspaper 1970. 1. 24). When the size of the 
position increased, even more investors joined the herds. Share prices fluctuated with 
high volatility, during which investors who were not involved in speculative trading 
were harmed. These investors staged a demonstration to express their anger and 
frustrations (Maeil Business Newspaper 1970. 2. 6). With the sheer size of the 
position increasing to new levels, there was great concern that one of the two parties 
would default on payment obligations. 
 
2.2 The Measure of June 3rd 
 
The Ministry of Finance (Minister: Duck-Woo Nam), which had shown reluctance 
to intervene, finally devised a measure on June 3, 1971. First, it required all stock 
transactions be settled on the fifth day, beginning on August 5, 1971. Second, it also 
banned two-sided trading, also beginning on August 5. Third, as an interim provision, 
it ordered all existing and unsettled positions be liquidated within 60 days (Maeil 
Business Newspaper 1971. 6. 8).  
The new measure, however, had to be suspended as securities firms filed 
injunctions against it. They claimed that the measure infringed upon their property 
rights. They also pointed out that the measure was based on the Enforcement 
Regulation, which was in breach of the Securities and Exchange Act. Article 79 of 
the Act delegated the choice of transaction systems to the Enforcement Decree, but 
not to the Enforcement Regulation. According to this logic, the administrative order 
based on the Enforcement Regulation was invalid.  
They filed two injunctions, one against the Ministry of Finance at the appellate 
court on the new transaction system, and the other against the Korea Stock Exchange 
at the civil district court of Seoul on the interim provision (Maeil Business 
Newspaper 1971. 6. 16). On June 23, the civil district court of Seoul accepted the 
injunction against the Korea Stock Exchange. According to the court’s verdict, the 
liquidation order had to be suspended until August 4. In July, speculative positions on 
the Korea Securities Finance Corporation shares grew even larger. To end the legal 
dispute, on July 29 1971, the government revised the Enforcement Decree and 
stipulated that stock transactions must be settled on the fifth day of the contract. The 
effective date was set to December 1. 
Thanks to the Ministry’s continuous persuasion and pressure, on August 16, the 
two parties reached an agreement (Maeil Business Newspaper 1971. 8. 17). 
Nonetheless, this was not without resistance. For example, the management of 
Sambo Securities strongly criticized the government and refused to comply, stating 
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that they were forced by the government to give in with substantial monetary losses 
(Maeil Business Newspaper 1971. 8. 17). 
 
B. The Introduction of Securities Deposit and  
Settlement Systems 
 
1. Background 
 
With the June 3rd Measure of 1971, stock transactions had to be settled with the 
actual delivery of shares, which proved to be very inconvenient. There was the risk 
that share certificates would be lost, as well as the costs which would be incurred to 
keeping them. To alleviate such inconveniences, the government decided in 1972 to 
adopt a securities settlement system similar to those adopted in the US and Japan 
(Rhee et al. 2005). To replicate the U.S. model, the government received technical 
assistance from USAID during the period of October-November 1972. The key result 
of this technical assistance was the establishment of a securities settlement system.  
 
2. Detailed Contents 
 
2.1 The Establishment of Korea Securities Settlement Corporation (KSSC) 
 
Korea’s first securities settlement system was introduced in February 1973, when 
the Securities and Exchange Act was revised. Initially, securities settlements were 
carried out within the stock exchange (November 1973 – December 1974). However, 
the function was soon transferred to the newly established Korea Securities 
Settlement Corporation (KSSC) on December 6, 1974.22 The new system, however, 
made slow progress, which prompted the government on July 7, 1975 to make it 
mandatory to settle all secondary market transactions by book-entry transfers (Korea 
Securities Depository 2003). 
 
2.2 Centralized Securities Deposit 
 
With the establishment of the KSSC and its book-entry transfer system, incidents 
of actual share delivery dropped considerably. But, there was no centralized 
depositary institution, and stocks were kept in many securities firms. As a result, 
shares had to be delivered from one securities firm to another (Maeil Business 
Newspaper 1979. 9. 13). There were even incidents of shares being stolen (Maeil 
Business Newspaper 1980. 6. 13).  
Against this backdrop, on December 20 1979, the Korea Securities Dealers 
Association decided that it would adopt a centralized depositary system. This system 
required that securities firm headquarters deposit at the KSSC 100 percent of the 
 
22It was renamed the Korea Securities Depository (KSD) in 1994. 
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shares they administered, and that regional branches deposit at the KSSC at least 70 
percent of the shares they administered (Maeil Business Newspaper 1979. 12. 21). 
Shares deposited at the KSSC, however, did not increase immediately. This led the 
government to intervene. In January of 1983, the government made it mandatory to 
deposit at least 90 percent of shares at the KSSC by no later than June 30 (Maeil 
Business Newspaper 1983. 1. 10). Related to this, on March 31 1983, the Securities 
Supervisory Board required all institutional investors to settle their transactions 
through the book-entry transfer system, which was administered by the KSSC.  
 
2.3 Continued Depository System 
 
A problem related to the centralized deposit system emerged early on. Whenever 
one provided shares as collateral, or transferred shares to a different name, the shares 
had to be withdrawn from the KSSC. In fact, near the fiscal year-end, securities firms 
had to withdraw a large number of shares from the KSSC, transfer the shares to 
another name, and then re-deposit them at the KSSC. In response to this 
inconvenience, industry experts called for the adopting of a continued depository 
system (Maeil Business Newspaper 1980. 1. 19). This refers to a system, in which all 
shares are kept under the name of the depositary agency, and shareholder rights are 
exercised indirectly through the agency. As a result, shareholders no longer had to 
withdraw their shares when providing them as collateral or transferring them to 
another name. 
Although its need was well-recognized, the continued depository system could not 
be introduced immediately. This has to do with the fact that Commercial Code did 
not allow split votes, or voting in disunity, and that under the continued depository 
system, all shares are kept under the KSSC’s name. This gives rise to a situation, 
where shares held by the same person (KSSC) are voted in opposite directions. But, 
this is illegal under the Commercial Code. To resolve this problem, the government 
revised the Commercial Code in April of 1984 and allowed voting in disunity. In 
September, it was also decided that the voting rights of shares under KSSC’s name 
will not be exercised, unless requested by the beneficial owner (Maeil Business 
Newspaper 1984. 9. 22). 
The continued depository system was launched in June of 1985, but it took some 
time for the new system to be commonly accepted. For firms with fiscal years ending 
in June of 1985, only 30 percent of shareholders had transferred their shares to the 
KSSC’s name (Maeil Business Newspaper 1985. 7. 4). 
 
2.4 Beneficial Owner System 
 
The continued depository system was adopted in 1985, based on a decision made 
by the Securities Management Commission, and not as a result of the Securities and 
Exchange Act. To stave off any legal dispute, the government revised the Securities 
and Exchange Act (promulgated on November 28), and introduced provisions on the 
continued depository system and the beneficial owner system. The latter system 
gives beneficial owners the shareholder rights equivalent to those held by 
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shareholders in the registry. The key provisions in the revised Act are summarized 
below. 
First, for securities deposited at the KSSC, the person who is stated in the account 
book shall be considered to hold the respective securities. Also, if there is a transfer 
between accounts for the purpose of transferring securities or establishing the right of 
pledge, the securities shall be considered delivered (Article 174-3). Second, for 
securities deposited at the KSSC, the depositor and the KSSC shall be presumed to 
have co-ownership over the deposited securities (Article 174-4). Third, for deposited 
securities, the KSSC can transfer them to its name and exercise its rights as a 
shareholder (Article 174-6).  
Fourth, if the issuing firm closes the shareholder registry to determine the list of 
shareholders that can exercise shareholder rights, such as voting rights, the KSSC 
should immediately notify the issuer the registry of beneficial shareholders (Article 
174-7). Fifth, the issuing firm must keep the registry of beneficial shareholders 
received from the KSSC. This registry shall have the same effect as the registry in the 
Commercial Code (Article 174-8). 
 
3. Evaluation and Implications for Developing Countries 
 
The securities settlement system, the concentrated deposit system, the continued 
depository system, and the beneficial owner system all made significant 
contributions in advancing the secondary market. However, they also made 
contributions to the primary market. If not for the reductions in trading and 
settlement costs in the secondary market, large public offerings during the second 
half of 1980s would not have been possible.  
One regretful point was the delay in adopting the continued depository system. 
The necessity was raised in 1980, but this measure was not adopted until 1985. The 
delay is attributable to the existing Commercial Code, which prohibited split votes. It 
took much too long to revise the Code.  
It is also worth noting that Korea actively benchmarked other countries when 
adopting its securities deposit and settlement systems. For the securities settlement 
system, the government received technical assistance from the experts dispatched 
from USAID. For the continued depository system, the government was influenced 
by precedents in the U.S., U.K., and Japan (Maeil Business Newspaper 1979. 9. 6, 
1979. 9. 21). Considering the case in Korea, other developing countries should also 
actively benchmark systems in advanced countries when adopting securities deposit 
and settlement systems.23    
 
  
 
23 Since 1995, Korea has offered its own technical assistance on securities systems. The first case was 
designed and implemented for Vietnam. Some other recent examples include the assistance with a securities IT 
system (Uzbekistan) and the establishment of a joint stock exchange (Laos and Cambodia).    
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C. The Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
 
1. Background 
 
In 1968, the government was criticized for allowing shares of state-owned 
enterprises to be acquired by a small number of Chaebols, a move clearly against the 
government’s stated goal of popularizing stock ownership. As a way of promoting 
dispersed share ownership, business and labor alike proposed to the government the 
introduction of an employee stock ownership plan (Maeil Business Newspaper 1968. 
6. 8). The proposal was accepted by the government, and the Capital Market 
Development Act was enacted in November of 1968, with provisions legalizing 
employee stock ownership plans (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1968. 11. 9).  
The Act had a provision which allowed discounted share offerings to SOE 
employees (Article 5) and a provision giving company employees preemptive rights 
to purchase newly offered shares (Article 6). This was clearly a step forward, yet it 
remained incomplete in the sense that such provisions applied only to listed firms or 
non-listed public firms.  
The employee stock ownership plan was pursued to achieve many goals, such as 
popularizing stock ownership, building employee wealth, establishing peace between 
labor and management, instilling company loyalty, motivating workers’ willpower, 
and expanding the stock investors’ base.  
Despite such enthusiasm, employee stock ownership plans were not widely 
utilized by firms in the beginning for many reasons. Dividend yields were too low to 
attract employers to hold shares. Salary levels were also too low to warrant any extra 
savings through shares. There were no tax benefits for these plans, and top 
management understood little about them (DongA Daily Newspaper 1972. 12. 28). 
The government tried to promote employee stock ownership plans in 1972 when it 
revised the IPO Promotion Act. The Act introduced a provision that allowed 
company employees a 10 percent preemptive right to buy newly-offered shares 
(Article 8).   
 
2. The Supporting Measures of 1974 
 
The employee stock ownership plans became widely accepted only after July of 
1974, when the Ministry of Finance (Minster: Duck-Woo Nam) announced a 
package of supporting measures. The package was prompted by the May 29th Special 
Order from the President (see section II.B.3, for details). President Park believed that 
the employee stock ownership plan, coupled with the factory-level Saemaeul 
Movement, could greatly promote peace between labor and management (Kim 2006). 
Supporting measures can be summarized as follows (DongA Daily Newspaper 
1974. 7. 13). First, they introduced a loan program for employees who wished to 
purchase company shares. Provided that an employee covers 50 percent of stock 
purchasing costs from his own salary, the company was required to give a loan (no 
interests during the first year of the loan) to finance the remaining amount. To induce 
companies to cooperate, interest earnings were excluded from taxable income in later 
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years. If employees purchased old shares, it was also possible for loans to be 
extended by the controlling shareholder. Again, no interest was charged during the 
first year.  
Second, it encouraged firms to give bonuses and severance payments through 
company shares. In such payments, a significant portion was exempt from labor 
income tax obligations. Third, it encouraged nonpublic firms to allocate 10 percent of 
IPO stocks to employee stock ownership associations.24 As an inducement measure, 
shares owned by employee stock ownership associations were regarded as publicly-
owned shares.  
Fourth, it encouraged firms to sell company shares at a discount. Moreover, to 
alleviate the employee tax burden, the resulting labor income or gift tax burden was 
partially exempted. Dividend income received by employees of nonpublic firms was 
also partially exempted from dividend income tax obligations.  
To prevent such tax benefits from being abused, the government made it clear that 
benefits do not apply to employees owning more than three percent of outstanding 
shares. Also, to prevent controlling shareholders from disguising their share 
ownership as employee owned shares, the Ministry required shares held by 
employees be deposited at the Korea Investment Development Corporation (KIDC) 
for at least one year for public firms, and multiple years for nonpublic firms until 
their IPO.25   
 
3. Evaluation and Implications for Developing Countries 
 
Two years after the announcement of these supporting measures, the number of 
firms with employee stock ownership associations reached 249 (217 public firms and 
32 nonpublic firms) by July of 1976. The number of enrolled employees also reached 
91,497 by this time. Among the 249 firms, 202 (including 17 nonpublic firms) were 
firms which deposited shares at the KIDC. The most exemplary firm was Daewoo 
Corporation, with all of its 691 employees enrolled owning 6.55 percent of company 
shares (DongA Daily Newspaper 1976. 7. 10). In 1987, the number of firms with 
employee stock ownership associations grew to 455.  
As mentioned earlier, employee stock ownership plans were introduced to 
popularize stock ownership, build employee wealth, establish peace between labor 
and management, instill company loyalty, motivate the will to work, and expand the 
stock investor base. Among these various goals, two objectives were clearly achieved: 
popularizing stock ownership and expanding the stock investor base. The employee 
stock ownership plan played a key role in absorbing newly offered shares during the 
1970s and 80s.  
Despite such benefits, employee stock ownership plan was not without problems. 
Enrolled employees would lose both their jobs and their stock wealth, if the company 
were to go bankrupt. Employee stock ownership plans therefore may not be the most 
desirable option for someone who simply wishes to diversify one’s wealth.  
 
24The 10 percent upper limit was raised to 15 percent in September of 1987. 
25Since 1977, KSFC became the depositary institution for ESOA held shares. During 1988 and 1993, MoF 
imposed a restriction that employees cannot sell their shares until they retire. 
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